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Where to Seek Strategic Assets for Competitive Catch-up? A Configurational Study of 
Emerging Multinational Enterprises Expanding into Foreign Strategic Factor Markets 
 
Abstract 
Emerging multinational enterprises (EMNEs) often engage in strategic-asset-seeking foreign direct 
investment (FDI) for competitive catch-up. This study explores the linkages between an EMNE’s 
competitive scenario consisting of a configuration of its awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) 
conditions and the comparative institutional advantages of its strategic-asset-seeking destination. Our 
configurational analyses of Chinese FDIs in the technology-intensive industries of OECD countries 
reveal a taxonomy of four distinct asset-seeking strategies of EMNEs. Our findings shed novel 
insights into the strategic variations within EMNEs based on a theoretically and methodologically 
extended AMC framework. This study also extends the varieties of capitalism literature by addressing 
the implications of comparative institutional advantages for foreign entrants, rather than domestic 
incumbent firms. 
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Introduction 
Emerging economy multinational enterprises (EMNEs) actively expand into foreign strategic factor 
markets, particularly in advanced economies, to seek assets that are unavailable in their home 
countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). The literature on EMNEs has 
contrasted the exploratory nature of asset-seeking foreign direct investment (FDI) with the 
conventional asset-exploitation strategies (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). However, the 
variations within the asset-seeking strategies remain underexplored. While research suggests that the 
asset-seeking strategy of EMNEs is driven by their competitive needs to catch-up with global market 
leaders (Awate, Larsen, & Mudambi, 2015; Cui, Meyer, & Hu, 2014), we do not know how EMNEs 
under different competitive scenarios will choose their asset-seeking locations that best fit with their 
various competitive needs.  
Host country institutional environment is central to FDI location choice (Kim & Aguilera, 
2015). Prior studies primarily draw on the economics (North, 1990) and sociological institutional 
perspectives (Scott, 2005). Focusing on institutional costs and legitimacy challenges (Kim & Aguilera, 
2015; Xu & Shenkar, 2002), these perspectives do not specifically account for institutionally derived 
advantages, which affect EMNEs choosing their asset-seeking locations (Boisot & Meyer, 2008). The 
distinction of the types of country institutional environments, and the comparative advantages 
associated with each type, lies in the domain of comparative institutional analysis (CIA). Institutional 
heterogeneity leads to variations in the strategic factor markets across countries that supply 
qualitatively different strategic assets (Clausen, 2014; Hall & Soskice, 2001). To fill the knowledge 
gap on EMNEs’ asset-seeking strategies, this study explores the linkages between an EMNE’s 
competitive scenario consisting of a configuration of interdependent decision-making factors, and the 
comparative advantage offered by the institutional environment of its FDI location. 
We extend the awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) framework of competitive dynamics 
(Chen, 1996; Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001) to the competitive catch-up context to guide our 
exploratory study. Prior studies suggest that AMC conditions influence the competitive behaviours of 
established multinational firms (Hutzschenreuter & Grone, 2009; Yu & Cannella, 2007). Recent 
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research also suggests that AMC conditions are indicative of the response of emerging economy firms 
towards inward FDI (Meyer & Sinani, 2009), as well as their decisions to conduct outward FDI for 
competitive catch-up (Cui et al., 2014). This study broadens the AMC framework and formally 
contrast the characteristics of AMC conditions between conventional competitive actions and 
competitive catch-up.  
We executed a research design following the procedures of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis (fsQCA). We used a combination of managerial survey and archival data from a sample of 68 
strategic-asset-seeking FDIs conducted by Chinese firms into the high-tech industries of OECD 
countries. Our findings reveal four distinct configurations of AMC conditions associated with two 
different types of comparative institutional advantages of FDI host countries. Based on these findings, 
supplemented by further qualitative case evidence, we propose a taxonomy of four distinct types of 
strategic-asset-seeking strategies by EMNEs, which include a casual updating strategy, a defensive 
mimicking strategy, a proactive experimenting strategy, and an aggressive overtaking strategy. 
This study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we contribute novel insights 
into the strategic variations of EMNE’s asset-seeking FDI. The classification of strategy has long been 
a central agenda of business research (Miles & Snow, 1978; Zahra & Pearce, 1990). Following this 
effort, our taxonomy showcases the various systematic and identifiable approaches by which EMNEs 
pursue their competitive needs of asset-seeking. It provides a theoretical toolkit of analysing strategic 
formulation of individual EMNEs, with implications for future research on their strategic outcomes. 
In so doing, we extend the literature on EMNEs from its prior focus on characterising EMNEs against 
their advanced economy counterparts, towards more nuanced analysis of strategic heterogeneity 
among EMNEs that contrasts them with each other. 
Second, we contribute to the comparative institutional analysis literature. Using a comparative 
approach, political economists have developed a range of varieties of capitalism (VoC) models that 
address cross-country differences of institutional arrangements (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancké, 
Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007; Whitley, 1999). While highly relevance to international business research 
(Martin, 2014; Jackson & Deeg, 2008), the VoC models focus exclusively on domestic economic 
actors, namely incumbent firms. For these firms, institutional comparative advantages are endowed 
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and predetermined by their countries of origins (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2008). 
Linking the VoC approach with FDI location choice, we argue that comparative institutional 
advantages can be strategically pursued by foreign firms. Therefore, we highlight the role of firm 
strategy in comparative institutional analysis from the perspective of foreign entrants. 
Third, we contribute to the AMC framework of competitive dynamics. The proponents of the 
AMC framework have emphasized that AMC conditions function in an interactive manner rather than 
in isolation (Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007). Our study is the first to 
capture the interactive nature of the AMC framework using a configurational meta-theoretical 
approach (Fiss, 2007; Fiss, Marc, & Cambré, 2013; Ragin, 2008a). This match will fully unleash the 
potential to reveal the interdependency between the complex and systematic linkages of AMC 
conditions and the competitive behavioural outcomes of firms.   
 
Theoretical background 
Strategic-Asset-Seeking FDI and Varieties of Capitalism 
EMNEs often target foreign strategic factor markets in advanced economies to seek access to superior 
technologies, managerial know-how, sophisticated human resources, and other strategic assets that are 
unavailable or hard to acquire domestically (Awate et al., 2015; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Musteen, 
Datta, & Francis, 2014). This type of strategic-asset-seeking FDI by EMNEs is recognized as a 
competitive behaviour that serves a firm’s catch-up strategic intent (Cui et al., 2014). However, it 
presents some unique features that distinguish it from the conventional competitive actions. 
Conventionally, rival firms initiate a series of attacks and counterattacks to offset the tactical and 
strategic effects of each other’s actions, with the aim of protecting and/or strengthening their 
competitive advantages (Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994). Strategic-asset-seeking FDI, on the other 
hand, is not triggered by specific market-based events, but by a firm’s strategic intent to transform its 
competitive position against market leaders with whom they aim to catch up in the future (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1989). This strategic intent drives firms’ competitive catch-up activities to secure long-term 
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strategic objectives, rather than winning a current competitive edge over an existing rival (Cui et al., 
2014; Luo & Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008). 
Strategic-asset-seeking FDI, as a competitive catch-up behaviour, can be directed at different 
locations of foreign strategic factor markets with comparative institutional advantages (Jackson & 
Deeg, 2008). Developed economies demonstrate considerable differences in institutional systems that 
underpin their strategic factor markets (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 2003). Based on the VoC 
model of Hall and Soskice (2001), a coordinated market economy (CME) presents comparative 
advantages for incremental innovation and specific assets, while a liberal market economy (LME) has 
comparative advantages for radical innovation and transferable assets (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson 
& Deeg, 2008; Martin, 2014). Compared to other CIA analytical approaches (e.g. Hancké et al., 2007; 
Whitley, 1999), the Hall and Soskice’s (2001) VoC model is more “firm-centred” (Amable, 2003: 81), 
in that it more directly addresses institutional resources available to firms and the ways firms solve 
their coordination problems (Hall & Thelen, 2009; Schneide, Schulze-Bentrop, & Paunescu, 2010). It 
helps underpin the institutional environments in which firms formulate catch-up strategy. Therefore, 
adopting their CME/LME distinction as a basis of understanding the strategic variations in EMNEs’ 
asset-seeking FDI, we maintain that EMNEs can leverage CME/LME comparative institutional 
advantages, with the aim of enhancing their competitive positions, by expanding into the types of 
foreign strategic factor markets that best fit with their specific strategic assets needs.  
 
Awareness-Motivation-Capability (AMC) Framework  
We adopt the AMC framework of competitive dynamics (Chen, 1996) as a guiding theoretical 
framework to identify the competitive conditions driving EMNEs to target foreign strategic factor 
markets with CME/LME institutional advantages. The AMC framework provides a foundation for a 
systematic understanding of the competitive conditions that interactively drive competitive catch-up 
actions. The application of the AMC framework requires researchers to identify its components that 
are most relevant to the specific competitive action under investigation (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Yu & 
Cannella, 2007). Accordingly, we extend the AMC framework from its traditional emphasis on 
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rivalrous competition (Chen & Miller, 2015), into competitive catch-up by identifying the specific 
AMC conditions most relevant for strategic-asset-seeking FDI by EMNEs (Table 1). 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The AMC framework is grounded in three streams of theory which are all relevant for 
competitive catch-up. The awareness dimension of the AMC framework derives from 
communication-information theory, which highlights the information seeking and information 
processing aspects of decision making (Smith & Grimm, 1991). The information most relevant to 
strategic-asset-seeking FDI is competitive threats and opportunities in foreign strategic factor markets 
(Cui et al., 2014); both of which are highly dynamic due to frequent technological changes and 
intensive competition in the global market. Therefore, EMNEs with long-term strategic needs 
(longitudinal awareness) and recognition of catch-up opportunities despite uncertainties and risks 
(lateral awareness) will be more likely to engage in competitive catch-up behaviours. More 
specifically: 
Longitudinal awareness. The strategic time horizon of a firm influences the longitudinal 
extent of its information scanning. Cognitive focus on future competitive threats and opportunities 
forms the strategic intent for competitive catch-up (Rui & Yip, 2008). Firms need to expand their 
strategic time horizon when evaluating the opportunities in foreign strategic factor markets, which can 
be leveraged to serve their long-term catch-up objectives. This is because commercial outcomes based 
on strategic assets, especially those that serve as strategic objectives to achieve enduring quality (such 
as those incrementally innovative and specific assets in CME environments) and innovation 
leadership (such as those radically innovative and transferrable assets in LME environments), may 
require a longer time period to be realized (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006).  
Lateral awareness. Competitive threats and opportunities often co-exist as two integral 
aspects of a competitive environment (Meyer & Sinani, 2009). Lateral awareness determines the 
extent to which a firm can recognize and capture valuable information despite uncertainties and/or 
risks. Information in the same competitive environment may be perceived and communicated 
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differently by firms depending on their risk tolerance level, which consequently influences the 
competitive action they will take. EMNEs are exposed to a significant level of risk when seeking 
strategic assets overseas given information asymmetry. Tolerance for risks is therefore important for 
EMNEs to overcome psychic distance that hinders knowledge transfer and learning.  
The motivation dimension of the AMC framework is supported by the expectancy-valence 
theory, which concerns the incentives for firms to engage in a competitive action (Chen et al., 2007), 
where the incentives are affected by the anticipated outcome of the action (Vroom, 1964). For firms to 
engage in competitive catch-up, the incentives must arise from the long-term perspectives of survival, 
growth, competitiveness, and, ultimately, market leadership (Awate et al., 2015; Cui et al., 2014), 
rather than from immediate gains in existing markets. Motivation is thus likely to be higher for firms 
whose survival is threatened due to intensifying global competition (external motivation), and whose 
internal financial position incentivizes them to redress current competitive disadvantages and/or to 
pursue future gains associated with sustainable competitiveness (internal motivation). Specifically: 
External motivation. Firms can be externally motivated to respond to competitive pressures as 
the contacts between rival firms intensifies (Yu & Cannella, 2007). Due to industry globalization, 
frequent interactions with global competitors can raise the competitive benchmark of EMNEs, expose 
their competitiveness gap with global rivals, and subsequently incentivize them to acquire foreign 
strategic assets that help close the competitiveness gap (Cui et al., 2014; Luo & Tung, 2007). 
However, research also suggests that laggard firms can act proactively, not based on their current 
competitive status, but by a certain strategic intent (Rui & Yip, 2008). This indicates that industry 
globalization is likely to be a discretionary condition for competitive catch-up as it may not influence 
the catch-up motivation of proactive firms as it does with other firms.  
Internal motivation. Competitive catch-up is also motivated by the internal resource position 
of a firm, particularly its unabsorbed slack (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; 
Tan & Peng, 2003), that provides risk buffer and thus incentives to engage in searching behaviours 
(Awate et al., 2015). This buffering role facilitates the motivation of strategic-asset-seeking FDI 
because it enables the firm to search broadly and continuously (Cui et al., 2014), and therefore 
increases the expectation for success (Vroom, 1964). However, a lack of unabsorbed slack can also 
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motivate searching behaviours, as firms may be driven by the hunger for resource security (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Lin, Cheng, & Liu, 2009; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). These different financial 
positions are likely to motivate firms to seek different types of assets. For instance, a high level of 
slack may motivate a firm to engage in distant search for radical improvements; whereas the security 
motive of a low level of slack may urge a firm to make incremental improvements while leveraging 
its existing resource base.  
The capability dimension of the AMC framework is informed by resource-based theories 
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Competitive actions are more likely to be successful when supported 
by action-enabling resources (Hambrick et al., 1996; Smith et al., 2001). In the context of strategic-
asset-seeking FDI, to successfully expand into foreign strategic factor markets, firms need to 
overcome liabilities of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) and outsidership (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009), by 
engaging with host country institutional actors to buffer the institutional costs of attaining host 
country legitimacy (institutional capability), and by leveraging linkages within business networks to 
access strategic assets and learning opportunities (network capability). Specifically, 
Institutional capability. Host country institutional barriers represent a significant challenge for 
firms conducting FDIs (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Zaheer, 1995). In particular, EMNEs may face 
legitimacy challenges in host countries due to political and social resistance from local stakeholders. 
These legitimacy challenges can create institutional barriers for accessing host country resources and 
strategic assets (Cui & Jiang, 2009). Overcoming such institutional barriers can be enabled by the host 
country political ties possessed by the investing firms. Connections with political actors can channel 
information and facilitate negotiations between institutions and businesses (Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 
2015). However, the effectiveness of political ties varies substantially across institutional settings and 
business activities (Li, Zhou, & Shao, 2009; Peng & Luo, 2000). Depending on the specific strategic 
assets targeted, host country political ties may be non-essential in a location where the formal 
institutions facilitating the strategic factor market are well-established, such as in OECD countries 
(Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012). As such, host country political ties are likely to be discretionary for 
strategic-asset-seeking FDI. 
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Network capability. Business networks create knowledge opportunities for learning, while a 
lack of access to business networks exposes firms to the liabilities of outsidership (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2009; Musteen et al., 2014). As valuable strategic assets, especially those knowledge-based 
resources, are embedded in host country business networks (Mathews, 2006), EMNEs need to 
leverage host country business ties to access such assets. Business ties with other organizations such 
as buyers, suppliers, and competitors can help firms establish collaborative business relationships that 
ultimately benefit business development (Peng & Luo, 2000). In the strategic-asset-seeking context, 
business ties can facilitate information sharing and resource exchange with business partners (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002). 
 
Research Propositions 
A Configurational Approach to the AMC Framework 
The nature of the interrelationships between the above identified AMC conditions and firms’ 
competitive behaviour in the catch-up context is central to the development of our research 
propositions. Prior studies have highlighted the interactive and interdependent nature of the AMC 
factors that trigger competitive action (Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen et al., 2007), and have called for a 
configurational approach to capturing such interdependency. The configurational approach is 
advantageous for explaining complex systems of relationships (Fiss et al., 2013, Ragin, 2008a). It 
shifts the focus from independent causal conditions to “tight constellations of mutually supportive 
elements” (Miller, 1986: 236), as the configuration of a set of causal conditions can provide a better 
explanation of the variance in behavioural outcomes than would be provided by isolating those 
conditions (Fiss, 2007, 2011; Miller, 1986). The configurational approach also allows for the 
detection of equifinality (Fiss, 2011), a situation where different combinations of causal elements that 
may lead to the same outcome (Katz & Kahn, 1978). In summary, the configurational approach 
recognizes that the individual causal elements are often an insufficient but non-redundant part of a 
solution, where the solution itself is unnecessary but sufficient for the result, namely, an INUS 
condition (Mackie, 1965). Table 2 shows the rationale of incorporating the configurational approach 
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into the AMC framework by reflecting the interdependency (conjunctural causation) and equifinality 
features of the AMC factors within the context of our study.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Interdependency among AMC Conditions 
The theoretical foundations of the AMC framework suggest interactions among its three dimensions. 
For instance, motivation development depends on the cognitive processes of sensing and evaluating 
(i.e., awareness) the value of action outcome and the ability (i.e., capability) to achieve that outcome 
(Vroom, 1964). Also, while a search for information is initiated upon the perception of a problem (i.e., 
awareness), taking action on the information will inevitably require organizational resources and 
commitments (i.e., capability) (Smith & Grimm, 1991). Furthermore, prior empirical studies show 
evidence of interdependency among AMC factors, although interdependency is treated as an 
exception rather than a normality in these studies. For example, Chen et al. (2007) show that the 
effects of awareness and capability factors on the perceived competitive tension leading to the extent 
of competitive action are contingent on the level of motivation. Hence, theoretical and empirical 
evidence supports that the AMC dimensions do not function independently of each other.  
With regard to the specific AMC conditions for strategic-asset-seeking FDI (see Table 1), 
both longitudinal and lateral awareness conditions are necessary for EMNEs to recognize the strategic 
needs and opportunities that could close the competiveness gap with global market leaders, but are not 
sufficient to trigger catch-up activities if the firm does not perceive enough incentives (i.e., not 
motivated) or does not possess sufficient capability to achieve the catch-up goals (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
While motivation, especially internal motivation, addresses the necessary incentives for firms to 
engage in competitive catch-up, it alone cannot lead to competitive catch-up action if the firm is 
unaware of which competitiveness gap to close and where to seek the needed strategic assets (Meyer 
& Sinani, 2009), or if it does not have the capabilities to access such assets (Cui et al., 2014). Lastly, 
capabilities to overcome liabilities of foreignness and outsidership enable EMNEs to penetrate foreign 
strategic factor markets, which constitute an indispensable part of the competitive catch-up strategy. 
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However, the capabilities alone do not guarantee competitive action if firms are not motivated to 
utilize them, or are not aware of where to leverage them (Deng, 2009). In summary, the individual 
AMC conditions identified in our research context are insufficient to trigger the action of competitive 
catch-up, but they jointly constitute necessary and hence non-redundant conditions for such an action. 
As summarized in Table 1, the longitudinal and lateral awareness conditions influence EMNEs’ 
recognition of CME/LME advantages in host countries, while their motivations of leveraging such 
advantages are induced by external competitive pressure and internal resource position, and their 
actions supported by their capability of penetrating institutional barriers and network boundaries for 
asset access. The question remains how these AMC conditions jointly relate to the specific 
comparative institutional advantages pursued by EMNEs. Therefore, to guide our exploratory analysis, 
we propose: 
Proposition 1: Configurations of AMC conditions are associated with the level of CME/LME 
institutional advantages presented by the locations of EMNEs’ strategic-asset-
seeking FDIs. 
 
Equifinality of AMC Configurations 
Equifinality of AMC configurations implies the possibility of different configurations of AMC 
conditions associated with the same outcome (i.e., the same level of CME/LME institutional 
advantage leveraged by EMNEs in their strategic-asset-seeking FDIs). This possibility is underpinned 
by the notion of competitive perception asymmetry. Chen and Miller (2012) argue that AMC elements 
influence competitive action via the perceptions of the actor, which are necessarily asymmetrical, 
because different decision makers may assign different levels of salience to the same condition 
(Marcel, Barr, & Duhaime, 2011). It is therefore possible that the same competitive scenario may lead 
to different competitive actions (Chen & Miller, 2012), and vice versa. As such, there is no fixed 
prescription for a competitive scenario that will be uniquely associated with a certain behavioural 
outcome. Hence, the linkage between AMC conditions and competitive behaviour outcome is unlikely 
to be unique, but possibly equifinal. 
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Specific to the context of this study, we argue that the possibility of equifinality is more likely 
when there are discretionary AMC conditions, which are non-essential to the competitive catch-up 
behaviour but add variations to the initial competitive scenario. This is because the salience of 
discretionary conditions, as opposed to essential conditions, is more likely to be perceived differently 
by the various actors, and as a result, both the absence and the presence of discretionary conditions 
may be associated with the same behavioural outcome due to competitive perception asymmetry. As 
presented in Table 1, we have identified certain AMC conditions as discretionary. For example, 
external motivation may be a discretionary factor that promotes competitive catch-up, as firms may 
choose to engage in catch-up strategies proactively before any external competitive pressure 
eventuates (Rui & Yip, 2008). Given this managerial discretion (i.e., some firms act proactively while 
others act reactively), the absence and presence of external motivation may both be present in the 
configurational solutions leading to competitive catch-up. Also, institutional capability may be 
discretionary as not all the desired strategic assets are politically sensitive, and firms can choose to 
avoid those assets that expose their liabilities of foreignness. This is more likely in host countries, 
such as advanced economies where government direct intervention of economic activities is not 
prevalent but rather is limited to key strategic sectors (e.g. defence industry and critical infrastructure). 
Moreover, EMNEs can also adopt a stealthier approach to foreign strategic factor markets, where they 
overcome institutional barriers by diluting their foreign identity (Cui & Jiang, 2012) and/or without 
relying on host country political ties. Accordingly, as EMNEs can vacillate between institutional 
capability and other means to respond to host country institutional barriers, both the possession and 
lack of institutional capability may be represented in configurational solutions leading to competitive 
catch-up. Overall, the presence and absence of these discretionary AMC conditions, while not 
influencing the catch-up action, do create varieties in the initial competitive scenarios that lead to 
EMNEs leveraging CME and LME institutional advantages in their strategic-asset-seeking FDIs: 
Proposition 2: Multiple configurations of AMC conditions can be associated with the level of 
CME/LME institutional advantages presented by the locations of EMNEs’ strategic-
asset-seeking FDIs. 
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Methodology 
Research Design 
Given the theoretical novelty of linking competitive scenarios with variations in the location choices 
of strategic-asset-seeking FDI by EMNEs, this study employs a research design of qualitative 
comparative analysis, which follows a synthetic strategy that integrates the strengths of variable- and 
case-based approaches (Ragin, 1987: 84), as it enables the exploration of configurational relationships 
based on empirical cases. Analytically, we followed a set-theoretic approach utilizing the technique of 
fsQCA for three reasons. First and foremost, while traditional regression-based analysis is more suited 
for isolating the effect of individual factors, fsQCA is able to model configurational relationships and 
equifinality (Schneider et al., 2010). These features are aligned with our research propositions. Second, 
although conventional methods, such as cluster analysis and deviation scores, can be used for testing 
typological and configurational theory, they are nevertheless limited in terms of providing insights 
into how different design elements work together (Fiss, 2007, 2011). Grounded in set theory, fsQCA 
is an analytic technique that allows for a detailed analysis of how conditions collectively relate to the 
outcome in question (Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 2007, 2011; Ragin, 2008a). Third, fsQCA is suited to analysis 
based on a small-to-medium sized sample (Ragin, 2008a), which is likely to be the case for studying 
an emerging phenomenon where information, in terms of both scope and depth, is limited. 
 
Sample and Data 
We conducted fsQCA on a sample of strategic-asset-seeking FDIs into OECD countries by Chinese 
high-tech manufacturing firms. We focused on OECD host countries because these countries have 
stable and advanced social and economic infrastructures which lead to comparative institutional 
advantages in sustaining advanced strategic factor markets (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hotho, 2014; 
Schneider et al, 2010). We focused on Chinese investing firms because China has become a major 
investor in the global marketplace, and Chinese firms are increasingly investing in developed 
economies with the strategic intent of competitive catch-up through strategic-asset-seeking FDI (Cui 
et al., 2014; Rui & Yip, 2008). As a result, our sampling frame consisted of all Chinese firms that (1) 
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fell in OECD’s (2011) classification of high-tech manufacturing industries, (2) were publicly listed 
during the period 2005 to 2011, and (3) had a market capitalization above 50 million US dollars. A 
total of 426 firms were included using this sampling frame. 
We conducted an executive survey to collect detailed information on the strategic-asset-
seeking FDIs of these firms. 86 out of the 426 firms had multiple records of strategic-asset-seeking 
FDIs into OECD countries during the observation period, and in these cases we asked the respondents 
to reflect on the latest FDI to ensure information accuracy by minimizing potential rosy retrospection 
bias. Hence, our unit of analysis is FDI, which matches with our objective of exploring the 
configurational linkages between the competitive scenarios faced by firms before their strategic-asset-
seeking FDIs and the levels of comparative institutional advantages associated with the chosen FDI 
locations.  
From June 2012 to March 2013 we received a total of 131 completed responses, yielding a 31 
percent response rate. From these responses, 68 were found to be valid as the associated firms 
provided information on their strategic-asset-seeking FDIs into OECD countries. We conducted non-
response bias tests on a range of investing firm characteristics including firm age, size (number of 
employees, total assets, total sales), ownership, and research and development (R&D) activities 
(expenses and intensity). No systematic difference was found between the responding and non-
responding firms, indicating that non-responding bias is not a major issue (detailed results upon 
request from the authors).  
We combined the survey data with archival data to construct our dataset. Most of the causal 
conditions, other than unabsorbed slack which was sourced from OSIRIS, were based on the survey 
data. The outcome variables, namely the LME/CME advantages associated with FDI locations, were 
based on the coordinated market index from Hall and Gingerich (2009), which were originally 
sourced from various research publications and OCED databases. A detailed explanation of data 
sources and variable calibration is presented below.  
 
Calibration 
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An advantage of fsQCA is variable calibration. Fuzzy sets are calibrated using external criteria, and 
not all variations are deemed important (Ragin, 2008a). External standards can be implemented by 
using specified values of an interval scale that correspond to the three key breakpoints of (1) full 
membership, (2) full non-membership, and (3) the crossover point; or by referring to a “qualitative 
assessment of the degree to which cases with given scores on an interval scale are members of the 
target set” (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008a: 85, 2008b). Based on the availability of established external 
standards and following the practices of prior fsQCA studies (e.g., Criily, 2011; Fiss, 2011; Hotho, 
2014; Judge, Fainshmidt, & Brown III, 2014; Schneider, et al., 2010), we adopted direct and indirect 
approaches to calibrate outcomes and causal conditions, the details of which are presented in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
CME and LME institutional advantages. We adopted the country coordination index of Hall 
and Gingerich (2009) to proxy the comparative institutional advantages associated with the location 
of the strategic-asset-seeking FDIs of EMNEs. This index was developed for Hall and Soskice’s 
(2001) VoC model, which is often contrasted with the clustering approach of the national business 
system framework (Hotho, 2014; Whitley, 2003). These two approaches are consistent in terms of the 
fundamental claim that configurations of country institutions shape the strategy, structure, external 
relationships, and innovation activities of firms, and are therefore the source of differences in 
institutional advantages across countries. The VoC model is more appropriate for this study because 
first, it pays particular attention to firms as well as firms’ interaction with the process of institutional 
adjustment and with other economic actors, including producer groups, trade unions, and 
governments (Amable, 2003; Hall & Thelen, 2009; Peck & Zhang, 2013). Second, it places emphasis 
on the difference in economic coordination mechanisms across countries which lead to comparative 
institutional advantages of leveraging different types of innovative activities. These advantages are 
particularly relevant for EMNEs conducting strategic-asset-seeking FDIs as they search for core 
competence enhancing solutions in foreign strategic factor markets. Moreover, this VoC model 
allows for the quantification of the level of comparative institutional advantages, which “serves the 
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analytical purposes of reducing complexity and facilitating the exploration of key dimensions and 
main relations” (Hotho, 2014: 6). 
Hall and Gingerich’s (2009) composite coordination indices of OCED countries were 
developed using the country-level indicators of shareholder power, dispersion of control, size of stock 
market, level of wage coordination, labour turnover, and degree of wage coordination (see Hall & 
Gingerich, 2009 for detailed sources of the indicators). These indicators produced two factors, which 
were coordination in corporate governance (CiCG) and coordination in labour relations (CiLR), through 
a confirmatory factor analysis procedure, where the values of the indicators were normalized to be 
between 0 and 1 using Thomson’s regression method with correlated factors. The resultant factor 
scores were used to create a composite index of strategic coordination as follows: 
Ci = (CiCG + CiLR) / max (CiCG + CiLR) 
The larger the composite index of strategic coordination for a country i (Ci), the more this 
country was incorporated into CME institutions, and therefore the greater the CME institutional 
advantages of its strategic factor market. With reference to the calibration approach adopted by 
Schneider et al. (2010) and Judge et al. (2014), we adopted a refined four-value fuzzy set calibration 
(cf. Ragin, 2008a). OECD countries, such as Germany, were considered as full members in the set 
and were assigned the value of 1. Countries, including Spain and the Netherlands, were considered as 
having a high degree of membership at the 0.67 level to represent “more in than out” in the set. 
Countries, such as Italy and Australia were considered as having a low degree of membership at the 
0.33 level to represent “more out than in” in the set. Countries, such as the US, were coded as full 
non-membership (i.e., a score of 0) of the set (cf. Schneider et al. 2010).  
LME institutional advantages, on the other hand, derive from the functioning of a market-
coordination mechanism in an advanced economy, which replaces strategic coordination (performed 
by the state or societal authorities) in terms of allocating economic inputs (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Hence, the more dominant the market-coordination mechanism over strategic 
coordination in a country (i), the more this country was incorporated into LME institutions, and 
therefore the greater the LME institutional advantages of its strategic factor market. As Ci represents 
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the extent of strategic coordination within a country i, the calibration of LME institutional advantages 
was the negation of the calibration of CME institutional advantages.  
AMC conditions. The longitudinal and lateral awareness factors, namely strategic time 
horizon and risk tolerance for innovation respectively, were calibrated based on the primary data 
gathered from our executive survey of the sample firms. We used Quinn’s (1985) scale of managerial 
strategic time horizon. Risk tolerance level was measured by a three-item scale adopted from Covin 
and Wales (2012) (α=0.69). We calibrated the two conditions by following the standard Likert scale 
approach introduced by Ragin (2008a) and Fiss (2011). Specifically, using a seven-point Likert scale 
measurement, we coded membership as fully out for a response of 2 or below (“disagree” or “strongly 
disagree”), and fully in for a response of 6 and above (“agree” or “strongly agree”). The crossover 
point was the middle of the scale (a neutral response of 4) (cf. Fiss, 2011).  
In terms of motivation factors, industry globalization was measured by a three-item scale 
adopted from Birkinshaw, Hood, and Jonsson (1998) (α=0.70) to capture external motivation. We 
then followed Fiss (2011) to use distribution-adjusted anchor points to calibrate the average score of 
the three industry globalization items. We used 3 (observed minimum), 4.5 (median), and 6 (observed 
maximum) as the anchor points for calibration. Unabsorbed slack was measured using the current-
ratio of the focal firm prior to the year of establishing strategic-asset-seeking FDI (Lin et al., 2009), 
which was sourced from the OSIRIS database to capture internal motivation. For calibration, we 
chose anchor points in line with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) standards for assessing Asian 
companies (IMF, 2014). Specifically, a current ratio below 1 was considered fully out (absent of 
sufficient slack), while a current ratio greater than 2 was considered fully in (presence of sufficient 
slack), with 1.5 as the crossover point.  
Institutional and network capability factors were captured by host country political ties and 
host country business ties respectively. Following prior studies, host country political and business 
ties were measured by survey scales adapted from Peng and Luo (2000). Three items of the survey 
asked executives to evaluate the extent to which they had utilized political ties prior to the focal FDI 
entry (α=0.84). Another three items asked executives to evaluate the extent to which they had utilized 
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business ties prior to the focal FDI entry (α=0.89). Following Fiss (2011), we used distribution-
adjusted anchor points of 3, 4.5, and 6 to calibrate the fuzzy-set membership of these variables. 
 
Results 
Configurational Solutions 
We started the analysis by testing whether any of the causal conditions qualified as a necessary 
condition. The results showed that none of the individual conditions exceeded the consistency 
threshold of 0.90 for necessary conditions (Greckhamer, 2011; Schneider et al., 2010). Table 4 shows 
the results of the fuzzy-set analysis of the linkages between the configurations of AMC conditions and 
the CME/LME institutional advantages associated with the strategic-asset-seeking FDI locations. The 
configurational solutions are presented in the style following the recommendation of Ragin and Fiss 
(2008), where black circles (●) indicate the presence of a condition and circled crosses ( ) indicate 
its absence. Large circles indicate core conditions while small ones indicate peripheral conditions. 
Blank spaces indicate ambiguous situations in which the corresponding causal condition may be either 
present or absent, and therefore play no significant role in the configurational solution. The fsQCA 
returned four solutions based on configurations of both core and peripheral conditions.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
We adopted a consistency threshold of 0.83 for CME solutions and a threshold of 0.81 for 
LME solutions following two analytical criteria. Firstly, we conducted a sufficiency analysis using 
Ragin’s (2008a) truth table algorithm to identify attribute combinations consistently linked to an 
outcome above the acceptable consistency benchmark of 0.80 (Greckhamer, 2011; Ragin, 2008a). 
Secondly, Schneider and Wagemann (2012) suggest that the “PRODUCT” value of consistency, 
which is a result of multiplying the consistency measure and Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency 
(PRI), should also be used as a complementary consistency measurement. We used a PRODUCT gap 
of 0.51 for CME solutions, and 0.61 for LME solutions. We obtained a coverage of 0.35 on CME 
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solutions and a coverage of 0.36 on LME solutions. These overall coverage levels indicate the 
empirical importance of the solution as a whole (Crilly, 2011; Ragin, 2008a). Table 4 also reports the 
raw and unique coverage levels for each individual configurational solution. 
The results provide support for our propositions. Overall, the consistency scores demonstrate 
the presence of a clear set-theoretic relationship. In other words, configurations of AMC conditions, 
rather than the conditions in isolation, are associated with the levels of CME/LME institutional 
advantages, supporting the interdependence of AMC conditions (Proposition 1). Moreover, we found 
multiple configurational solutions of AMC conditions are linked with a high level of either CME or 
LME institutional advantages, which support the equifinality of AMC configurations (Propositions 2).  
 
Interpretation of Configurational Solutions  
Each configurational solution identified from the fsQCA (see Table 4) represents a unique 
competitive scenario underlying the location choice for the strategic-asset-seeking FDI of EMNEs for 
competitive catch-up. Interpretation of these configurational solutions provides an in-depth 
understanding of strategic diversity in the strategic-asset-seeking FDIs of EMNEs. Four detailed 
configurational solutions, corresponding to four strategic types of strategic-asset-seeking FDI, are 
illustrated below. It should be noted that the fsQCA results alone cannot infer causality. Although the 
results do establish the relationship, and we collected our data in such a way that the AMC conditions 
proceeded the FDI event, we do not have direct evidence for a causal mechanism (or the exclusion of 
other mechanisms for that matter). Therefore, we do not intend to make causal inference from the 
fsQCA results. Instead, the results provide evidence for a taxonomy of strategic-asset-seeking 
strategies of EMNEs, by suggesting distinct combination of AMC factors associated with different 
institutional comparative advantages. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we identified 
representative cases associated with each solution from truth tables (available on request), where 
cases with membership greater than 0.5 imply substantive case knowledge (cf. Greckhamer, 2011; 
Hotho, 2014). We present detailed qualitative information regarding one representative case for each 
solution. All case information was collected from publicly available archival sources (e.g. corporate 
annual reports, corporate minutes, media interviews, and news reports). 
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Solution 1 represents strategic-asset-seeking FDI conducted under financial stress (lack of 
unabsorbed slack) but with no immediate external competitive pressure (absence of industry 
globalization), which implies that the investing firm lacks incentives to engage in aggressive or 
radical competitive catch-up. This type of FDI does not necessarily reflect a clear long-term strategic 
objective, and is targeted towards foreign strategic factor markets with CME institutional advantages 
that support the development of incremental innovation assets. By implementing this strategy, the 
investing firm can update its competitiveness incrementally through leveraging the resources available 
via its network linkages (e.g. business ties in the host country) to primarily redress any internal 
resource shortage that threatens the firm’s survival. Constrained by the lack of internal financial 
flexibility and political assets internationally, this type of strategic-asset-seeking FDI is likely to be 
carried out in a casual manner. We term the strategy derived from solution 1 as a casual updating 
strategy of strategic-asset-seeking FDI. A typical case from our sample that represents this solution is 
Zoje Sewing Machine’s partial acquisition of Duerkopp-Adler in Germany. 
Zoje Sewing Machine Co. Ltd (Zoje, hereafter) is a privately-owned listed company, which 
supplies affordable sewing machines to clothing companies. As a typical niche market 
product, industrial sewing machines have a limited market size with price sensitive buyers. To 
maintain its market share and profitability, Zoje needed to continuously improve its product 
quality while lowering its manufacturing costs. To fulfil its strategic needs for delivering new 
products to the domestic market and enhancing its incremental innovation capability, the 
company sought strategic assets in CMEs. During the global financial crisis (GFC), Zoje’s 
German partner, Duerkopp-Adler Sewing Machine Co., Ltd (DA, hereafter), suffered heavily 
loses around 20 million Euros per year. As a leading manufacturer in the sewing machine 
market, DA has a good industrial reputation for reliable products. To enhance its own R&D 
capability for incremental innovation, Zoje first situated its subsidiary in Germany in June 
2010, and then invested 12.8 million Euros for 29% of the shares in DA one month later. In 
return, DA transferred some of its manufacturing technology to Zoje Europe, the German FDI 
project of Zoje. With skilful R&D staff from a CME and systematic technology from DA, 
Zoje, since 2010, has gradually updated its manufacturing technology and quality. However, 
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due to financial constraints, and the lack of solid political ties within Germany, Zoje’s FDI 
project in Germany was mainly concerned with updating its technology to deal with short-
term challenges. In 2014, Zoje divested its 29% shares in DA in order to maintain cash flow 
for future development.  
Solution 2 represents a type of strategic-asset-seeking FDI by financially distressed investors 
with long-term strategic orientation. This type of FDI does not necessarily respond to immediate 
international competition, however, it is targeted towards foreign locations in order to obtain 
incrementally innovative and specific assets (CME advantages). This indicates that the investing firm 
intends to build upon its existing resource base to become a more efficient competitor in its specialty 
niche, but not to deviate radically from its existing resource base. Moreover, the capability 
requirements for both institutional and network aspects indicate that such FDI needs to penetrate 
substantial host country barriers to access the desired strategic assets, which are not readily available 
from the open market. Overall, this strategy has a developmental focus on the long-term strategic time 
horizon and incremental approach of the strategic-asset-seeking behaviour. We term this strategy as a 
specialty developing strategy. The case of Huayi Compressor Co’s merge with Gubigel in Spain 
demonstrates this strategy.  
Established in 1996, Huayi Compressor Co. Ltd (Huayi, hereafter) is a state-owned listed 
company specializing in compressor manufacturing. Before 2012, the company focused on 
manufacturing compressors for home appliances, which only provided a 10% gross profit 
margin. Realizing the limited market potential for its existing products, Huayi launched a new 
strategy in 2011 to upgrade its manufacturing capability through FDI, and to diversify its 
product line to industrial compressors which have a 20% gross profit margin in the global 
market. In early 2012, Cubigel Compressor Co. Ltd. (Cubigel, hereafter), a reputable Spanish 
compressor manufacturer, nearly went bankrupt. As one of the top four industrial compressor 
manufacturers in the world, Cubigel had more than 20% of the market share in Europe. 
Although the financial burden of this Spanish manufacturer was heavy, Huayi was optimistic 
regarding its long-term market potential if it could be merged with Huayi. Huayi planned to 
spend 3- 5 years on post-merger integration with Cubigel, which showed a longer term vision 
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and an incremental manner for the upgrading of production capabilities through a cross-
border merger. With government support and strong business ties in Spain, and Huayi’s long-
term strategic orientation and risk tolerance, the FDI project of merging Cubigel eventually 
succeeded in 2012 and Huayi’s investment helped Cubigel to make a profit in the same year. 
Four years after this merger, Huayi became the second largest compressor manufacturer in the 
world, and the largest industrial compressor manufacturer in Europe. 
Solution 3 reveals a strategy by which EMNEs with strong financial positions can utilize 
network capabilities to exploit LME institutional advantages for seeking radically innovative and 
transformable strategic assets with uncertain commercialization value. This strategy is driven by a 
long-term vision rather than being motivated by immediate external competitive pressure. In fact, the 
absence of industry globalization conditions in this configurational solution indicates that the 
investing firm is initiating a catch-up strategy proactively before international competitive pressure 
penetrates its home market. This catch-up strategy is also exploratory and experimental, because LME 
strategic assets support radical innovation which can generate significant variations in the value and 
applicability of outcomes, which then expose the catch-up firm to substantial uncertainty. We term 
this strategy as a proactive experimenting strategy. Kingenta’s Greenfield investment in a US-based 
R&D subsidiary represents this strategy.  
Kingenta Ecological Engineering Group (Kingenta, hereafter) is a key Chinese high-tech 
enterprise devoted to R&D, production, and marketing of slow/controlled-release (SCRF), 
water soluble (WSF), compound, phosphorus chemicals, and other specialty fertilizers. Since 
it was founded in 1998, Kingenta has quickly developed into one of the world’s largest 
production bases of SCRF with RMB 8.7 billion of total assets. Kingenta’s Chairman, Lianbu 
Wan, stated that “Kingenta needs to have a long-term vision, and aims for international 
markets. We must act quickly and seize opportunities to enter into foreign markets in order to 
obtain pre-emptive advantages, rather than follow our rivals.”  Motivated by strong financial 
resources and healthy cash flows, as well as having the goal of building long-term 
cooperation with American research institutions to enhance its R&D capability, the company 
had funded several rounds of industry exhibitions and forums, and enticed potential American 
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partners to visit its headquarters in Shandong Province in China. Also Kingenta’s top 
management team had taken several business trips to the US in order to understand the 
heterogeneous agriculture regulations in different states which may impact on its production 
of SCRF, and more importantly to develop local business networks. In 2007, through 
collaborating with local business partners, Kingenta’s FDI project in the US successfully 
introduced a new SCRF product that had the same quality as other internationally renowned 
brands but with much lower production costs.  
Solution 4 captures the type of strategic-asset-seeking FDI based on a long-term strategic 
vision and a strong internal financial position which motivates the investing firms to explore 
unfamiliar territories for cutting-edge competitive resources. With this strategy, a catch-up firm 
actively utilizes its internal financial buffer to aggressively pursue institutionally sensitive resources 
in foreign strategic factor markets, with the long-term goal of overtaking the competitive position of 
incumbent global market leaders. This aggressive move requires strong institutional capabilities in 
combination with network capabilities to offset liabilities of foreignness and outsidership. In order to 
challenge global market leadership, EMNEs implementing this aggressive catch-up strategy need to 
look beyond their comfort zone, given that updating their existing advantages incrementally reduces 
the likelihood of EMNEs overtaking the incumbent global leaders from advanced economies. Instead, 
it is imperative that the catch-up firms search broadly and in an exploratory manner in foreign 
strategic factor markets with LME advantages, especially for foreign strategic assets that support 
radical innovation. We term this strategy as an aggressive overtaking strategy for strategic asset 
seeking. Hikvision’s Greenfield FDI project in the US is used to illustrate Solution 4 further.  
From its inception in 2001, Hikvision has grown as one of the world’s largest suppliers of 
video surveillance products and solutions. Featuring the industry’s strongest R&D workforce 
(5,300 researchers and specialists equalling 44.2% of the company’s full-time equivalent 
workforce) and devoting eight percent of its annual revenue into R&D for continued product 
innovation, Hikvision has adopted a future and long-term orientated corporate strategy with 
an emphasis on challenging and overtake current market leaders. In a media interview, the 
vice president, Yibo Zheng, emphasised that “we have great ambitions to develop our 
25 
 
company as a future global leader in a rapid way. Therefore, we are buying important R&D 
related strategic assets everywhere”. To collaborate with local business partners in the US that 
have each specialized in different stages of the advanced manufacturing process, Hikivision’s 
FDI project was initiated with the aim of integrating design, development, and manufacturing 
of innovative standard- and high-end products in this global industry. However, it was 
recognized that a potential obstacle of entering into advanced markets was the sensitivity 
within local communities regarding the extent to which their privacy would be protected by 
surveillance products/technology that were introduced by a foreign producer.  Prior to 
investing in the US market, Hikivision built solid relationships with local government and 
legal authorities, as well as business distribution and technology partners, in the US through 
industry exhibitions and forums with the aim of building trust with locals. Moreover, 
sufficient financial resources due to IPO in China have enabled Hikivision to undertake an 
aggressive asset-seeking strategy in the US and motivated it to overtake its competitors from 
developed countries in the long run. After eight years, the FDI project in the US has led to 
Hikvision becoming one of the top global brands and one of the top 10 suppliers in its 
industry. 
 
Robustness Tests 
We performed robustness checks to understand the stability of the configurational solutions. 
Following Crilly (2011), we checked the robustness of our results by reducing the threshold used in 
the fsQCA procedure. Specifically, a reduced consistency threshold of 0.75, the minimum threshold 
recommended by Ragin (2008b), Crilly (2011), and Meuer (2014) was adopted. Although the 
coverage level increased (0.50 for CME solutions and 0.69 for LME solutions), the overall solution 
consistencies reduced significantly (0.71 for CME solutions and 0.71 for LME solutions). Nonetheless, 
this test reproduced all of the 4 configurational solutions from the original test. 
We also conducted a robustness check to rule out some alternative explanations for the 
configurational solutions, such as FDI into OECD countries for market-seeking or institutional escape, 
rather than strategic-asset-seeking purposes. With the full sample of 131 FDIs into developed and 
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developing countries, we performed fsQCA using the same AMC conditions but with alternative 
outcome variables, such as host country gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita growth rate, 
and the World Governance Index (WGI). These additional tests helped us to solidify the proposed 
AMC framework as a theoretical ground for understanding strategic-asset-seeking FDIs as a 
competitive catch-up strategy. If similar configurations of AMC conditions were found to explain 
market-seeking (GDP and GDP per capita growth as outcome variables) or institutional escape 
(governance quality as an outcome variable) FDIs by EMNEs into OECD countries, then we would 
not be able to conclude that the configurational solutions identified by us necessarily reflect a 
taxonomy of competitive catch-up strategies. As expected, these additional tests did not produce 
similar solutions. Indeed, forcing the AMC framework on the analyses of market-seeking or 
institutional escape FDIs generated poor results by fsQCA standards. For example, when analysing 
GDP and GDP per capita growth rate, only one solution for each could be generated and these had a 
considerably low consistency threshold (e.g. 0.35 coverage score with 0.68 consistency score for GDP, 
and 0.33 coverage score with 0.80 consistency score for GDP growth rate per capita). Detailed results 
of these robustness tests are available upon request. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
EMNEs expand into foreign strategic factor markets through strategic-asset-seeking FDI. The drivers 
of this strategic behaviour are associated with the competitive needs of a firm (Cui et al., 2014; 
Hutzschenreuter & Grone, 2009), while its outcomes vary as firms expand into foreign locations 
differentiated by their respective comparative institutional advantages (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; 
Jackson & Deeg, 2008). There has been a knowledge gap in the literature regarding the location 
choice for strategic-asset-seeking FDI by EMNEs for competitive catch-up purposes. Based on the 
VoC model that distinguishes CME and LME institutional advantages, this study explores the 
strategic variation in the strategic-asset-seeking FDI by EMNEs through integrating the AMC 
framework with a configurational approach towards the identification of configurational relationships.  
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Main Findings 
This study identifies the configurations of AMC conditions that are associated with CME/LME 
advantages of an EMNE’s strategic-asset-seeking FDI location. The four configurational solutions 
provide support to our propositions that (1) the awareness, motivation, and capability conditions of 
competitive behaviours jointly explain the strategic-asset-seeking behaviours of EMNEs in a 
systematic and non-linear additive manner, and that (2) the strategic-asset-seeking FDIs by EMNEs 
can be driven by equifinal configurations of AMC conditions, representing the alternative competitive 
scenarios faced by the investing firms who may have the same strategic asset needs. Finally, our 
findings contribute to the development of a taxonomy of strategic-asset-seeking FDI strategies. 
Specifically, a causal updating strategy and a specialty developing strategy are pursued by EMNEs 
targeting foreign strategic factor markets with CME institutional advantages, while a proactive 
experimenting strategy and an aggressive overtaking strategy are enabled by targeting strategic factor 
markets with LME institutional advantages. Overall, these findings enrich our understanding of the 
unconventional internationalization strategy postulated in the existing EMNE literature (Awate et al., 
2015; Cui et al., 2014; Luo & Tung, 2007), which has focused on why EMNEs conduct FDI for 
competitive catch-up, but not how, or more specifically where, they implement this strategy. 
 
Contributions 
This study makes the following contributions to the literature on EMNEs, comparative institutional 
analysis, and competitive dynamics. Firstly, existing literature on EMNEs acknowledges FDI as a 
channel of spring-boarding (Luo & Tung, 2007) or linkage-leverage-learning (LLL) (Mathews, 2006) 
for competency building. It is well documented that seeking strategic assets is one of the most 
important motives for EMNEs (Cui et al., 2014; Lu, Liu & Wang, 2011; Luo & Tung, 2007). 
However, this line of research mainly focuses on characterising EMNEs against their advanced 
economy counterparts, and accordingly highlights the unifying characteristic of EMNEs’ 
internationalization strategy. A deeper understanding of EMNEs require examination of the 
heterogeneity in EMNEs’ strategic choices when pursuing internationalization as a channel of 
competitive catch-up. Our configurational analyses and taxonomy development is a timely effort in 
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this direction. As with other frameworks of strategy classification (e.g., Miles & Snow, 1978), our 
taxonomy provides a conceptual classification of individual EMNEs. It implies that there are various 
systematic and identifiable approaches by which EMNEs pursue their competitive needs of asset-
seeking, which may be associated with different strategic outcomes. In other words, the taxonomy 
equips researchers with a theoretical toolkit of differentiating EMNEs with each other, rather than 
treating them as a homogenous group. 
Secondly, this study links comparative institutional analysis with the internationalization 
strategy of EMNEs. The comparative approach of institutional analyses is originally intended for 
country-level comparison (Chatain, 2014; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hotho, 2014), with business 
implications mainly within countries (Clausen, 2014). Firm strategy has played a very limited role in 
this literature, other than the notion of institutional arbitrage by developed country firms. Generally, 
the institutionally derived comparative advantages have been considered exogenous to firms, as 
endowments by firms’ countries of origin. How foreign firms can strategically pursue such 
comparative institutional advantages in a host country has not been studied. Our study integrates the 
role of firm strategy into the comparative approach of institutional analyses by examining the 
implications of comparative institutional advantages from the perspective of foreign entrants. We 
specifically demonstrate that VoC models, such as the CME/LME model of Hall and Soskice (2001), 
which have been predominantly applied to study the behaviours of business actors within a given 
country’s institutional environment, can be a useful theoretical framework for analysing cross-border 
business activities. As such, we bring comparative institutional analysis closer to the core of 
international business research agenda. 
Thirdly, we contribute to the competitive dynamics literature by addressing the 
interdependencies of the AMC framework using a configurational approach. Prior research has 
recognized the interdependent nature of the elements in the AMC framework (e.g., Chen et al., 2007), 
but research efforts to delineate the systematic complexity have been constrained by a conventional 
correlational approach (Cui et al., 2014). The configurational approach adopted in this study accounts 
for this complexity both theoretically and empirically (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008a). Moreover, our 
extension of the AMC framework to the context of strategic-asset-seeking FDI also echoes the call by 
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Chen and Miller (2015) for reconceptualising competitive dynamics to incorporate a wider range of 
competitive behaviours of firms (Chen & Miller, 2015). Overall, the theoretical extension and the 
configurational approach opens up new opportunities for the AMC framework to guide competitive 
scenario analyses across various competitive contexts.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations of the study indicate potential directions for future research. First, we adopt Hall and 
Soskice’s (2001) VoC model instead of other alternatively because this model is more centred on firm 
behaviours (Amable, 2003; Schneide et al., 2010). However, as with all the other CIA approaches, 
this model has its own limitations. One criticism concerns its dichotomous classification of capitalism 
systems, which lead to potential oversights of more detailed types of comparative institutional 
advantages. The other criticism is that this model does not address the role of the state, which 
necessarily limits its applicability to the analysis of a wider range of countries, such as the Asian 
varieties of capitalism (Witt & Redding, 2014) and some other European economies (Hancké et al., 
2007). EMNEs are increasingly expanding their footholds in not only the traditional advanced 
economies, but also other host countries to fulfil their asset-seeking objectives. Consequently, the 
adopted VoC model might obscure highly relevant differences in the institutional competitiveness of 
different locations (e.g. Italy vs. the Netherlands) as well as in the competitive configurations of firms 
seeking strategic assets, such as the motivations and institutional capabilities required in state-
organized business systems versus collaborative business systems. Moreover, the country-level proxy 
of CME/LME advantages cannot account for regional variations within a country. In light of these 
limitations, future research may evaluate alternative VoC models and explore more nuanced measures 
for institutional advantages that may be applied to country and regional levels. 
Second, our empirical analysis, based on cross-sectional data, relies on the assumption of 
path-dependency in institutional evolvement. This key assumption underlies the literature on the 
varieties of capitalism (Jackson & Deeg, 2008), indicating that the differences in institutional 
arrangements between LMEs and CMEs tend to be stable over time (Hall & Gingerich, 2009). 
Nonetheless, the competitive environment and characteristics of firms can evolve over time. As a 
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result, the strategic types included in our taxonomy may be implemented by EMNEs at different 
stages of their development. The potential sequential adoption of various competitive catch-up 
strategies could be investigated in future research by employing a longitudinal research design. 
Relatedly, as EMNEs evolve into a mature stage of internationalization, their scale and scope 
of FDI activities may present a possibility where a single firm may be simultaneously pursuing 
multiple types of FDIs, leading to a mixed, or an integrated, strategy. Although the majority of 
EMNEs are still in early stages of their internationalization where multiple strategic types of FDIs are 
uncommon within a firm, overtime an integrated strategy is likely to become more prevalent. Future 
research may have the opportunities of analysing the integrated FDI strategies of EMNEs by drawing 
on multi-level data where multiple asset-seeking FDIs are nested within a firm.  
 
Practical Implications 
The findings from this study offer several practical implications. In general, we highlight the 
importance of evaluating the competitive needs and capabilities of a firm when crafting strategies for 
expanding into foreign strategic factor markets. Specifically, our findings suggest that risk tolerance 
and building up business networks in host countries consistently exists in the mentality of decision 
makers within EMNEs, and most of the decision makers have a long-term orientation in pursuing 
institutional advantages in OECD countries. This implies that entrepreneurial culture and strategic 
vision are important conditions for firms to pursue competitive catch-up through strategic-asset-
seeking FDI. Furthermore, the findings reveal that investing firms with relatively weak or limited 
firm-level resources and less environmental pressure (particularly firms who implement a “casual 
updating strategy”) would prefer to focus on foreign strategic factor markets with CME institutional 
advantages, while investing firms that have solid firm-level resources and intensive environmental 
pressure (particularly firms who implement an “aggressive overtaking strategy”) tend to seek foreign 
strategic assets facilitated by LME institutions. Understanding these behavioural patterns can enable 
host country businesses and policy-makers to better interact with incoming EMNE investors through 
the identification of potential areas of collaboration so as to capitalize on complementary strengths.  
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Table 1. AMC conditions for competitive catch-up through strategic-asset-seeking FDI 
Conditions under the A, M, and C dimensions Differentiating between the two types (CME and LME) of outcomes 
Essential and discretionary conditions 
distinguished within the dimension 
 
Awareness 
• Strategic time horizon – competitive catch-up requires cognitive 
focus on future competitive threats and opportunities 
(longitudinal awareness) 
• Risk tolerance for innovation – firms need to overcome 
awareness barriers (e.g. uncertainties, risks, and psychic 
distance) in order to realize learning benefits (lateral awareness)  
 
 
No – awareness of long-term strategic 
needs and opportunities is always 
required for firms to engage in any 
kind of competitive catch-up 
behaviours 
 
 
No –firms need to recognize the long-
term strategic value (longitudinal 
awareness) and the possibility of 
realizing the value (lateral awareness) 
to justify their behaviour, hence both 
conditions are essential 
 
Motivation 
• Industry globalization – competitive contacts intensify 
motivation to respond (external motivation) 
• Unabsorbed slack – both high and low levels of unabsorbed 
slack provide organizational incentives for searching behaviours 
(internal motivation) 
 
 
Yes – firm-specific conditions form 
incentives for either incrementally 
improving firm’s resource position to 
secure survival or radically taking 
risks to pursue novel resources 
 
 
Yes – since competitive catch-up 
behaviours are mainly internally 
motivated, external competitive 
pressure may be non-essential for 
proactive firms   
 
Capability 
• Host country political ties – political ties play buffering and 
enabling roles (Zheng et al., 2015) that allow firms to overcome 
institutional distance and liabilities of foreignness (Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002; Zaheer, 1995) (institutional capability) 
• Host country business ties – linkages of business network create 
knowledge opportunities for learning that allow firms to 
overcome liabilities of outsidership (network capability) 
 
 
No – liabilities of foreignness and 
outsidership exist regardless of the 
type of strategic assets firms seek in 
foreign strategic factor markets 
 
 
Yes – while network linkage is a pre-
requisite for learning, non-market 
strategy based on institutional 
capability may be non-essential in an 
environment where formal institutions 
are well-developed, such as the OECD 
countries 
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Table 2. A configurational approach to the AMC framework 
 Two meta-theoretical approaches to organizational research Evidence that AMC framework is 
configurational  Correlational (ceteris paribus conditions) Configurational (INUS1 conditions) 
Effects of 
individual 
causal 
elements: 
 
Additive or 
conjunctural? 
• Additivity of individual effects is 
generally assumed 
• Individual causal element is 
assumed to be capable of 
influencing the outcome regardless 
of the presence or absence of other 
elements 
• As such, each individual element is 
an independent cause for the 
outcome 
• Interaction between individual 
effects is generally assumed 
• Individual effects are conjunctural 
in that the role of any individual 
element is critically dependent on 
the presence or absence of other 
elements 
• As such, each individual element is 
an insufficient but non-redundant 
part of a causal solution 
• Theoretical foundations of the 
framework suggest that the AMC 
components overlap and interact 
• Prior empirical studies show that 
the strength of the effect of 
individual AMC elements is 
contingent on other elements 
• As such, individual elements will 
not affect action independently, but 
in conjuncture with other elements 
Possible 
combination(s) 
of causal 
elements into 
causal 
solution(s): 
 
Unifinal or 
equifinal? 
• There exists one optimal 
configuration of causal elements 
• Theoretically relevant causal 
elements can be empirically fitted 
through an OLS regression to form 
a unique linear combination 
• As such, the optimal causal 
solution is uniquely identifiable 
• Causal elements form subgroups to 
influence the outcome 
• Equifinal subgroups, namely 
different combinations of causal 
elements, may lead to the same 
outcome 
• As such, each causal solution is 
itself unnecessary but sufficient 
• AMC elements influence 
competitive action via the 
perceptions of the actor 
• Competitive perceptions are 
asymmetrical, firms under different 
AMC conditions may be prompted 
to the same competitive behaviour 
• Discretionary AMC conditions may 
contribute to equifinal 
configurational solutions 
INUS refers to “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition, which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” (Mackie 1965:245). 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 3. Calibration of sets 
Type Variable Measurement & Data Source Calibration Anchors 
Fuzzy 
Sets Note and References 
Outcomes 
CME institutional 
advantages 
Based on the co-ordination index of Hall and 
Gingerich (2009) 
0.1, 0.33, 
0.67, 0.95 4 
Qualitative judgment for anchor points 
following LME/CME country 
classification grouped by Hall and 
Soskice (2001), and empirical 
applications (e.g. Judge et al. 2014; 
Schneider et al. 2010). 
LME institutional 
advantages 
Based on the negation of Hall and Gingerich’s 
(2009) index 
0.1, 0.33, 
0.67, 0.95 4 As above 
Awareness 
Strategic time horizon 
(Longitudinal 
awareness) 
A single item scale adopted from Quinn (1985) 2, 4, 6 3 Standard Likert scale approach. See Ragin (2008a) and Fiss (2011) 
Risk tolerance for 
innovation (Lateral 
awareness) 
A 3-item scale (α =0.69) adopted from Covin & 
Wales (2012) 2, 4, 6 3 
The standard Likert scale approach. 
See Ragin (2008a), and Fiss (2011) 
Motivation 
Industry globalization 
(External motivation) 
A 3-item scale (α =0.70) adopted from 
Birkinshaw et al. (1998) 3, 4.5, 6 3 
Distribution-adjusted calibration 
anchor points following Fiss (2011) 
Unabsorbed slack 
(Internal motivation) 
One-year lagged current ratio (Lin et al., 2009), 
data sourced from OSIRIS 1, 1.5, 2 3 
Anchor points follow International 
Monetary Fund standards for assessing 
Asian companies (IMF, 2014) 
Capability 
Host country political 
ties (Institutional 
capability) 
A 3-item scale (α =0.84) adapted from Peng & 
Luo (2000) 3, 4.5, 6 3 
Distribution-adjusted calibration 
anchor points following Fiss (2011) 
Host country business 
ties (Network capability) 
A 3-item scale (α =0.89) adapted from Peng & 
Luo (2000) 3, 4, 5 3 
Distribution-adjusted calibration 
anchor points following Fiss (2011) 
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Table 4. Configurational solutions 
Competitive antecedents of strategic asset-seeking FDI 
Expansion into foreign strategic factor markets with: 
CME  institutional advantages LME institutional advantages 
Solution 1 Solution 2 Solution 3 Solution 4 
Awareness     
Strategic time horizon (Longitudinal awareness)     
Risk tolerance for innovation (Lateral awareness)     
Motivation     
Industry globalization (External motivation)     
Unabsorbed slack (Internal motivation)     
Capability     
Host country political ties (Institutional capability)     
Host country business ties (Network capability)     
Consistency 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.85 
Raw Coverage 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.27 
Unique Coverage 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.07 
Overall Solution Consistency 0.84 0.85 
Overall Solution Coverage 0.35 0.36 
Note: Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, and circles with "X" indicate its absence. Large circles indicate core conditions; small ones, 
peripheral conditions. Blank spaces indicate “don't care”. 
 
